Gérard Genette’s Evolving Narrative Poetics
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Author of what is perhaps the most perennial treatise of the early years of narratology and whose influence is among the most pervasive, Gérard Genette produced a narrative theory in a context that rendered that theory unique. Appearing at a time when structural linguistics, a shaky doctrine at best, was called on to act as a “pilot science” for the social sciences, Genette’s *Narrative Discourse* filled a number of gaps in the emerging approach to the study of narrative. Where other studies were focused largely on devising formal models of the “story” level, *Narrative Discourse* turned toward the signifying level, “discourse.” Where an unbridged territory lay between the deeper levels and the surface level, *Narrative Discourse* explored the various relations between the narrated story, the signifying narrative text and the narrating act. And where the new paradigms were neglectful of the more traditional questions of narrative theory—point of view, narrator-character discourse, narrative time, the status of the narrator—*Narrative Discourse* integrated them into the narratological debate. Not the least of its achievements was to have provided an innovative terminology for narrative devices, a terminology which, for instance, adopted the term “diegesis” from film theory in order to mark off the presence or absence of the narrator in the narrated world (homodiegetic vs. heterodiegetic) from the relation of the narrating act to the narrated events (extradiegetic vs. intradiegetic), or, to take another example, a terminology that drew attention to iterative narration (saying one time what occurred several times) as a form of syllepsis that shares with analepsis and prolepsis the feature of “taking together.” All in all, the achievement of *Narrative Discourse* was to set a new standard by providing a comprehensive and well-articulated approach to describing and analyzing the texture of narrative as a self-regulating system.
Many of the terms inaugurated by Genette have long been household words of the theoretical and critical discourse about narrative, even beyond paradigms that do not consciously adhere to his system. Although this theory together with its terminology and the welcome synthetic treatment of familiar narrative devices and techniques offered by *Narrative Discourse* have contributed to the book’s success, the theory and its application have been submitted to various critiques. In part, these critiques have resulted from but also contributed to a certain codification of the system, as revealed in school manuals and elsewhere by use of its terminology as mere labels, either devoid of its theoretical import, misapplied to the textual organization it is meant to describe, or appropriated in ways that are incompatible with its original intent.

The reply to these critiques came with the publication of *Narrative Discourse Revisited* in 1983. Rather than summarize the pros and cons of the various arguments put forth, what I would like to point out here is that a number of the questions debated in this book and carried on by other researchers in other forums might never have been raised, or they would have been approached from a different angle, had *Narrative Discourse* never appeared. What would the state of research on perspective and point of view be today had Genette, in introducing the notion of focalization, not drawn a distinction between “who sees?” and “who speaks?” Contested, modified and reformulated, Genette’s focalization in fact opened up new lines of investigation: re-conceptualizing of the relations between speaker and focalizer thanks to fine-grained linguistic analyses of the expression of subjectivity; the necessity of accounting for focalization at both micro- and macro-level; the impact of focalization that varies within a single sentence; etc. Another example of a theoretical issue for which the stage was set by Genette but whose ramifications were to be explored in other research contexts is voice. Finding grammatical person a questionable criterion by which to classify narrators and thus adopting the opposition homodiegetic/heterodiegetic, which allows
for degrees of narrator presence in the story, he identified a space for borderline, mixed and ambiguous narrators (*Revisited* 104). It was some years later (in 1994) that Monika Fludernik, in a special issue of *Style* devoted to second-person narrative, took fuller account of this form, noting for example the propensity of second-person narrators for present-tense narration, their tendency toward a certain complicity with the narratee and the affinity of such narration with interior monologue—features that are in no way incompatible with Genettian narratology.

Other examples could of course be cited, but the point I wish to make is that although Genette’s narrative theory might appear to be dated from the vantage point of postclassical narratology, this may not be the case when it is viewed in accordance with what it itself purports to be: *a study of the specificity of narrative within the scope of an open poetics*. Now, from this perspective, it would be fitting to reconsider *Narrative Discourse*, not as a paradigm case of classical narratology with its rage for taxonomies, binarisms and closed and sterile formalisms, but as a method that navigates between the particular (in this case, Proust’s *Remembrance of Things Past*) and the general to which all organized bodies of knowledge, including the theory of literature, aspire. What David Herman, in “Sciences of the Text,” observed about Roland Barthes’s pre-*S/Z* narrative theory would then also hold true for Genette and his other contemporaries, namely that narratological theories of the classical period did not have at their disposal the resources of discourse analysis, text grammars and methods for oral and conversational storytelling which were in a state of gestation at the time, but that they prefigured developments that were to take form at a later time. This being the case, and unlike several of the more recent theories of narrative that draw on the postulates of possible worlds logic or on those of the cognitive sciences or theories that model themselves after the methodologies of sociolinguistics or artificial intelligence, Genette’s approach does not seek to incorporate other scientific paradigms, but rather to position itself within poetics. It is in fact rather astonishing to read in the introduction of *Narrative Discourse* that the
analysis of Proust’s novel will be conducted, not with structural linguistics and its categories as its theoretical basis, but by analogy with rhetorical expansion of the traditional grammatical—and not linguistic—categories of the verb: tense, mood and person (29).

So the question that now arises is this: if Genette’s narrative poetics is to be included under classical narratology, where lies the fault line between classical and postclassical narratology? According to Herman’s well-known discussion, postclassical narratology, synonymous with narratologies (of which poststructuralist narratology is but one variety), is characterized by “a plurality of models for narrative analysis,” and it incorporates classical narratology as one of its “moments” (“Introduction” 1). It tests the limits and possibilities of its structuralist ancestor, enriching it with more inclusive and open-ended paradigms and methodologies, but with the same goal of developing rigorous descriptive and explanatory models. Narratology, once “a subfield of structuralist literary theory,” has since expanded its scope to include “any principled approach to the study of narratively organized discourse” (27 n. 1). Ansgar Nünning, for his part, draws a sharper line between the two when he opposes structuralist (“classical”) narratology to the new (“postclassical”) narratologies: the one is text-centered, focuses on narrative langue, textual “features” and “properties,” emphasizes formalist description and taxonomies, and constitutes a (relatively) unified (sub)discipline, etc.; the other is context-oriented, focuses on narrative parole and the dynamics of the reading process, favors thematic readings and ideologically-charged evaluations, and represents an interdisciplinary project of heterogeneous approaches, etc. (“Narratology” 243 – 44).

The transition between the two phases can perhaps best be summarized in Martin Kreisworth’s phrase: “the narrative turn.” Overall, the narrative turn stems from two factors. First is the ubiquity of narrative, the fact that narrative informs all aspects of human experience and knowledge and is thus present in all disciplines, calling for a transdisciplinary approach to narrative theory that embraces, not only literature and the humanities, but also
jurisprudence, medicine, the social and even the natural sciences. Second is the “export” of narratological concepts and methods to other literary genres (transgeneric narratology) as well as to non-literary and non-linguistic narratives (transmedial narratology) and even an appeal to narratology as a “master discipline.” It is this expansion of research agendas that has provided postclassical narratology with its dynamism and that has also spawned a host of so-called compound or “hyphenated” narratologies—some twenty-five, by Nünning’s count, not to speak of a nearly equal number of applications of varying narratological relevance. Needless to say, the risk inherent in “Narratology’s Centrifugal Forces,” as Jackson G. Barry has put it, is to dilute the very principles that were the hallmark of the original theory and its driving forces, although I hasten to add that many first-rate postclassical narratologists have not fallen prey to this risk and continue to work in the spirit of discrimination and rigor that characterize narratological research.

In contrast to the research agendas growing out of the narrative turn, the object of Genette’s narrative poetics is the specificity of narrative, not its ubiquity. The theory seeks to describe the functioning of narrative in a delicate balance between the particular and the general rather than to elaborate a model valid for narrative in other fields or to incorporate paradigms borrowed from other disciplines—a situation which seems to have colored the postclassical view of Genette. For my part, I shall not take issue with an author for failing to do what he never intended to do in the first place. More pertinently, it is worth pointing out—and this leads to one of the main points I wish to make—that references to Genette in published research on narrative theory over the past few decades are limited almost exclusively to Narrative Discourse, Narrative Discourse Revisited and a small number of earlier essays plus, occasionally, a few isolated pages of Fiction and Diction. All too frequently left out of account by narrative theorists is Genette’s important work on transtextuality, poetics, aesthetics and the theory of art that succeeded the narratological
studies and whose implications for narrative theory are rarely discussed. The proper context in which to place Genettian narratology, it seems to me, is not a transdisciplinary theory of narrative cultivated by postclassical narratology, but an open poetics.

Included in the French edition of *Narrative Discourse*, but not in the English translation, are two essays, “Critique et poétique” and “Poétique et histoire,” that stake out the early stage of Genette’s conceptual framework for narrative theory. Where the object of criticism is the work in its singularity, its closure, that of poetics is a general theory of literary forms, the combinatory possibilities of discourse, such that the singular work is but a particular case beyond which other possibilities can be foreseen or deduced: not the “real” of literary discourse, but its “virtual”—“literariness,” to adopt the Russian formalist term. Historically, poetics studies not the succession of works but transformations, in other words, permanence and change: for this reason, the historical object of literature is “the elements transcending works and constitutive of the literary game that, in a word, we shall call *forms*: rhetorical codes, narrative techniques, poetic structures, etc.” (*Figures III* 18 my translation). These conceptual distinctions are fundamental, for they cast light on Genette’s characteristically typological style of reasoning, his “tabular poetics,” as Christine Montalbetti put it in a fine volume devoted precisely to Genette’s “open poetics”: if the aim of his narrative theory is to highlight the functioning of narrative, its “immanence,” the accent of poetics, which embraces both the actual and the virtual, falls on “transcendence” of the text, the extension and exploration of fields of investigation.

Transcendence is a key notion in Genette’s poetics and aesthetics that will be more fully developed in *The Work of Art*, it being emphasized that in this system transcendence is in no way to be associated with mysticism or with expression of the sublime. The object of poetics is not the singular text but, as maintained in *The Architext* and further developed in *Palimpsests*, “textual transcendence of the text”: “all that sets a text in a relationship, whether
obvious or concealed, with other texts” (*Palimpsests* 1). This textual transcendence, also
called “transtextuality,” takes the form of five types of relations, extending from the inclusion
of one text in another (intertextuality) to the most abstract or implicit relation such as genre
(architextuality) and including the critical relation (metatextuality), transformation of one text
by another (hypertextuality, studied in *Palimpsests*) and the “intermediate zone” lying
between texts and the surrounding social discourse (paratextuality, studied in *Paratexts*). The
transtextual dimension of Genette’s poetics, almost never referred to by postclassical
narratologists, addresses a number of topics that are currently under debate. To take one
example, the recent transgeneric applications of narratology, predicated on the “export” of
narratological concepts to lyrical poetry and drama, are examined in *Palimpsests*, but in a
wholly different light. The dramatization of a narrative text (or narrativization of a play)
involves a specific type of hypertextual transformation, a change of *mode* in the sense of Plato
or Aristotle, or “transmodalization.” What occurs in such cases is not the extension of
narratological principles and paradigms to cover another genre, but a form of textual
transcendence in which a given mode of representation is transformed into another with, of
course, the technical consequences that such a transformation entails. On another plane,
paratextuality, broken down into *peritext*, which surrounds the text within the volume,
includes both editorial features (title page, cover, composition, etc.) and *epitext*, lying outside
the text properly speaking, either public (e.g. interviews) or private (journals, rough drafts,
correspondence, etc.). Paratextuality forms a privileged crossroads of pragmatic and strategic
of negotiation, contributing to a “community of interest” that allows a book, literary or
otherwise, to be presented as such. It is notable that the “toolkit” conceptions of narratology
propounded by some, focused on the textual properties of narrative and thus on textual
immanence, are apt to totally overlook the broader picture of the various forms of transtextual
relations and thus the crucial role that poetics can play in the theory of narrative.
It can be concluded, then, that when considered transtextually, the typological reasoning that underlies Genette’s tabular poetics should not be reduced to a “boxing in” of the literary text, as poststructuralists would be inclined to say, but is rather a means by which the text transcends its immanence: “the text interests me (only) in its textual transcendence” (Architext 81). This being the case, texts in their materiality have no particular status as such, but acquire one only when apprehended in a web of transtextual relations. Genette is thus led to inquiring further into the literariness of literature, in other words (to quote Jakobson), into “the differentia specifica of verbal art in relation to other arts and in relation to other kinds of verbal behavior” (Jakobson 350; qtd. in Fiction 2). For Genette, the pertinent question is to determine how it is that an aesthetic function is attributed to certain verbal objects. This matter is taken up in Fiction and Diction, where three aspects of literariness are investigated: its regimes, its criteria, its modes.

There exist two regimes of literariness, one constitutive or essentialist, independent of any judgment (a sonnet is a sonnet, a novel is a novel, etc.), the other conditional, subject to individual aesthetic judgment (an autobiography appreciated for the eloquence of its style, a novel that revolutionizes narrative technique, etc.). These regimes intersect with two criteria: thematic (what the text is “about”) and rhematic (the type of discourse exemplified: poetry or prose). Regime and criterion combine to form two modes of literariness: fiction, defined by the imaginary nature of its objects; and diction, characterized by its formal features. The common trait between the two modes is their transitivity, fiction being pseudo-referential and diction a form of discourse in which “signification is inseparable from verbal form” (25). When looked at in the broader perspective of Genette’s poetics, it can thus be seen that textual immanence is transcended on the one hand by various types of transtextual relations, and on the other by overlapping dimensions and facets of literariness.
In the same volume, Genette takes up the relations between fictional and factual narrative, a question largely ignored by classical narratology due to its bias toward eighteenth-to twentieth-century prose fiction. From the perspective of the categories established in *Narrative Discourse*, he finds no radical differences between the two forms in strictly narratological terms. To better apprehend the relations between them, he thus modifies the criteria somewhat, firstly by introducing two antithetical views of fictional and factual narrative: that of John Searle, for whom there exists “no textual, syntactical, or semantic property that will identify a text as a work of fiction” (Searle 65; qtd. in Fiction 57), as opposed to Käte Hamburger (followed by Dorrit Cohn), who focuses on the textual “indexes” of fictional narrative, notably markers of the characters’ subjectivity such as free indirect speech. Genette arrives at a balanced compromise as to the applicability of these two positions, adopting a “gradualist” stance on the relations between fictional and factual narrative (thus setting himself off from Cohn’s “separatist” approach): heterodiegetic fictional narrative, for example, is often a mimesis of history or of chronicles, while the new journalism draws freely on the techniques of literary fiction (*Fiction* 81). The other important innovation of this article is that it introduces a new factor into narrative voice: the author. Genette works out the five possible functional relations of identity and non-identity between author, narrator and character that come into play in narratives. Identity between the three characterizes autobiography, just as non-identity between them marks heterodiegetic fiction. On the other hand, identity of narrator and character but non-identity of either with the author signals homodiegetic fiction. Overall, the non-identity of author and narrator defines fictional narrative and their identity, going so far as to assimilate the narrator into the author, is characteristic of factual narrative. But the system is in no way constrained to these general postulates, due in part to the fact that introduction of the author into a narrative is as much a matter of paratextuality as it is of narratology. Thus, Caesar’s *The Gallic Wars*, in the third
person, is an autobiography whereas Yourcenar’s *Mémoires d’Hadrien*, in which narrator and character coincide but not narrator and author, is the autobiography of a historical figure by a fictitious narrator.

The discussion of fictional and factual narrative exemplifies the evolution of Genette’s narrative theory away from a “restricted narratology”—the study of narrative with a particular focus on its specificity—toward an open poetics (*Fiction* 56). The general framework of this development is confirmed by other factors including the integration of transtextual relations into the system as well as by a differentiated analysis of the aesthetics of literature—its literariness. And this leads to the general aesthetic theory elaborated in *The Work of Art* and *The Aesthetic Relation*, a theory already sketched out in a chapter of *Palimpsests* devoted to “hyberaesthetic practices” and touching on non-linguistic types of transformation in painting and music. With this extension of the field of investigation, however, comes the realization that aesthetic questions exceed the boundaries of poetics and that literariness covers a range of phenomena too narrow to fully address the relations between aesthetics and art (*Fiction* x, 29). And indeed, one of the principal innovations of *The Work of Art* is to shift the emphasis away from literariness to “artistry” (from *littérarité* to *articité*) in an effort, not to define the beautiful or to provide a classification of the arts (the traditional concerns of aesthetics), but to analyze the artistic relation, a particular type of the more general aesthetic relation, at the same time amplifying patterns of reasoning already present in Genette’s earlier work in poetics.

The first of the two volumes explores the modes of existence of the work of art’s immanence and transcendence. Adopting with a number of revisions a distinction formulated by Nelson Goodman, Genette explores the two regimes of immanence. The *autographic* regime consists in the materiality of artistic objects which lend themselves to direct sensorial perception: “things” such as an original painting or a carved sculpture which are either unique
and subject to forgery or multiple and open to reproduction (cast sculpture, printmaking); and “events,” corresponding roughly to the performing arts. The *allographic* regime covers forms of art whose object or event is ideal. Where in the autographic regime there is no distinction between immanence and physical manifestation, in the allographic regime immanence emerges from the constitutive features established by convention or common to the iteration of multiple manifestations through execution or (de)notation (cf. type/token): for the literary text, recitation (diction) and inscription; for the musical text, performance and score; for stage production, performance and stage directions. Thus an edition of *Ulysses*, whether mass produced or pirated, remains *Ulysses*, provided the copy is “orthographically” correct. In practice, the allographic regime engages the recipient in a process aimed at identifying the constitutive properties immanent to the ideal object or event, sifting them out from contingent properties—a process of “allographic reduction.” As a mental operation, this process underlies the attitude of reception that contributes to determining the artistic object.

Transcendence consists in all the ways the physical object or event or the ideal object or event of immanence are “exceeded.” Where given works are concerned, the autographic and allographic regimes are mutually exclusive; as modes, however, transcendence and immanence are compatible and complementary while the modes of transcendence, of which there are three, can coexist. The first type of transcendence, *plural immanences*, results from the author’s intention to produce a new version, but not a new work, as illustrated by adaptations and revisions, for example. *Partial manifestations* are a form of transcendence that occur either in fragments of incomplete works or indirectly (a hypertext that offers a glimpse of its hypotext, a sound recording of a musical performance). And finally, the *plural work* results either from physical transformation (the changes that have occurred to the Parthenon over time) or, more particularly, from a multiplicity of receptions, from the functional plurality of works. As a metaphor of the plural work, Genette mentions a story by
Borges in which two identical texts of *Don Quixote*, one by Cervantes, the other by Pierre Ménard three hundred years later, are constitutive of different works: different interpretations of the same literal meaning governed by widely separated historical and interpretational contexts.

The regimes of immanence and their modes of transcendence constitute the modes of *existence* of the work of art, but not its modes of *action*. The latter is the realm of two types of relation which, in aesthetic theory, are often made to coincide, but that Genette is careful to separate: the *aesthetic relation*, consisting in “an emotional response (of appreciation) to an attentional object, whatever it might be, considered with regard to its aspect—or rather an attentional object constituted by the aspect of an object, whatever it might be” (*Aesthetic* 222); and the *artistic relation*, resulting from the ascription of an aesthetic relation to a natural or a man-made object (artifact) and whose locus is the interaction between the aesthetic and the technical. When aesthetic objects (“something that is [now] the object of aesthetic attention,” meaning that “it is not the object that makes the relation aesthetic, but the relation that makes the object aesthetic” [10–11]) and artifacts overlap, the result is a work of art, defined early in the first volume as follows: “a work of art is an intentional aesthetic object, or, what comes to the same thing, a work of art is an artifact (or human product) with an aesthetic function” (*Work* 4 emphasis original). Key to this definition is the concept of intention, which comes in two forms. Production of any object in the human sphere proceeds from an intention in the strong sense, while reception of that object hinges on intention in the weaker sense, notably, attention to one or another of the object’s aspects such that an attempt by the receiver, justified or not, to “seek out” in or to ascribe to an object an aesthetic function bestows on that object the status of a work of art. A similar duality, reflecting a subjective relativism at the level of aesthetic appreciation, is affirmed in a reiteration of the definition of a work of art in the second volume when it is noted that interpretation can be either objective and ontological
(“in order to be a work of art, an object must in fact proceed from an aesthetic intention”) or subjective and functional (“in order to function as a work of art, an object must be received as proceeding from an aesthetic intention”) (Aesthetic 215). This distinction translates respectively into artistries of the constitutive type and artistries of the attentional type and is the equivalent, in aesthetics, of what Genette had earlier described as the constitutive and the conditional regimes of literariness. And finally, the argument can be viewed as a reformulation of Goodman’s proposal to replace the question “What is art?” with “When is art?” by asking: “When is there an aesthetic relation?” This enables Genette to conclude, from Goodman’s implicit and unavowed position, that being a work of art and functioning as a work of art are conditions independent of one another, with the consequence that the artistic relation is not fully dependent on the objective artistic status of an object (210 – 15).

It will not escape the attention of readers that Genette’s two works on aesthetics and the artistic relation make no mention of Narrative Discourse or Narrative Discourse Revisited or that the premises and descriptive procedures of his structuralist narratology are supplanted by frequent references to analytical philosophy. The shift in emphasis, however, may not represent an abandonment of earlier concerns that it might seem to at first sight. As suggested throughout this commentary, a constant conceptual patterning can be traced in the course of Genette’s evolution, extending from his early insistence on separating the general from the particular in poetics and literary criticism to other categories aimed at highlighting various aspects of literary and artistic phenomena: constitutive/conditional literariness; textuality/transtextuality; immanence/transcendence; artistic/aesthetic relation. This being the case, Genette’s writing after his narratological studies can be regarded, in one of its facets, as a way of specifying and developing the theoretical framework of his narrative theory.
One might be tempted, in light of these considerations, to conclude with a transition from classical to postclassical narratology, that is, to return to Herman’s observation, the passage from narratology as “a subfield of structuralist literary theory” to “any principled approach to the study of narratively organized discourse”—a response, in effect, to Kreiswirth’s “narrative turn.” By and large, Genette’s followers and critics alike have approached his narratological studies along the lines of narrative immanence, giving little consideration if any to the modes of textual transcendence by which narratives are defined interrelatively with other narratives and other forms of (mainly) artistic expression or to the broader implications for narrative theory of aesthetic and artistic relations. To the extent that Genette has incorporated non-literary aesthetic phenomena and philosophical aesthetics into the scope of his research, he can be said to work in a spirit of transdisciplinarity comparable to that of postclassical narratology. On the other hand, his primary focus, since the 1980s, has not been “narratively organized discourse” or the adoption of new methodologies brought to bear on the study of narrative, but, among other things, how certain objects, natural but in particular artifactual, are endowed with aesthetic or artistic functions. From this perspective, Genette’s narrative theory should not be regarded as or regarded only as “a subfield of structuralist literary theory,” but as a theory of a particular kind of cultural exchange whose constitutive categories are determined by or governed by the interaction of aesthetic attention and appreciation.

Such a context for narrative theory does not appear to have been explored by postclassical narratology. This, at least, is what can be concluded from Nünning’s two-page inventory, where no heading is to be found for “Narrative Poetics” or “Narratology and Aesthetics” and where it is among “Philosophical Narrative Theories” under the heading “Narratology and Theories of Fictionality,” in an apparent reference to Fiction and Diction, that Genette’s name appears. Genette himself has not undertaken a re-examination of his
earlier narrative theory against the backdrop of his more recent writings, but his example serves as a powerful suggestion that the future evolution of narratology may have much to gain by considering narrative in its relations to poetics and aesthetics.

Works Cited


